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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appel lee,
Case No. 20010536-CA

CLAY Y. STARK,
Defendant/Appel lant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals from a judgment and convuMon ',>' iiivin^ mulei 'IK1 miluence
of alcohoi

f Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2001),
; an open container in a vehicle, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah

Code * r.i\ z - <>-44.20 (1998), in the Second Judicial District Court, Weber County, the
Honorable Stanton

lylor presiding.

sdiction under Utah Code

Ann. .} "S-2 \ ViMleMSupp 2001J.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
inadequate briefing and

Issue No. 1(a): Should thi;
react

was ineffective?
Issue No. 1(b): If this court does address the merits, was trial counsel ineffective

for:

(1) not pursuing a motion to suppress evidence that would have been denied
because defendant's detention and arrest were clearly proper;
(2) not objecting to the State's allegedly improper notice of expert testimony, even
though there is no indication that the notice was improper; or
(3) not objecting to expert testimony that was clearly proper to lay the foundation
for admission of the results of breath tests performed on defendant?
Standard of Review: "When, as in this case, the claim of ineffective assistance is
raised for the first time on appeal, we resolve the issue as a matter of law." State v.
Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah App. 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1999) is relevant to resolution of this case. A copy is
attached as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 18, 2000, defendant was charged by information with driving under the
influence of alcohol and having an open container (R. at 1-2).
Defendant's trial counsel initially requested a suppression hearing, but later
decided not to pursue a motion to suppress (R. 29, 31).
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At trial, defendant attacked the veracity of the Intoxilyzer results in part by noting
that Deputy Talbot's certification in the use of the machine had temporarily lapsed at the
time he performed the test (R. 116:106-07).
Jury Instruction No. 28 stated: "The lack of certification of Deputy Talbot and its
effect or lack of effect upon the test result is an issue to be decided by you." (R. 84).
On April 18, 2001, a jury convicted defendant on both counts (R. 94-95). He was
sentenced to an indeterminate term of up to five years in prison (R. 100). He timely
appeals (R. 103).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 14, 2000, Weber County Deputy Sheriff Jason Talbot was on patrol when
a vehicle sped past him in the opposite direction with a completely flat tire (R. 116:23).
Because driving on a flat tire is a safety violation - and a safety hazard - the deputy
turned around intending to pull the vehicle over (R. 116:24). However, by the time he
reached the vehicle, it had already pulled into a parking lot (id.).
Deputy Talbot activated his overhead lights and made contact with the defendant,
who was driving the vehicle (R. 116:25,41). The deputy immediately noticed a "very
distinct odor of alcohol" on defendant's breath (id.). The deputy also noticed that
defendant had an open can beer sitting near him (id.).
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Deputy Talbot asked defendant if he had been dnnking (R. 116:26). Defendant
"stated that he'd drank all night until 3:00 in the morning" (id.). Defendant also
acknowledged he had consumed "one or two right before I stopped him" (id.).
Deputy Talbot asked defendant for his license, but he stated that his license had
been revoked (R. 116:28). Deputy Talbot then asked defendant if he would perform field
sobriety tests, but the defendant refused (R. 116:27). Defendant was arrested for
suspicion of DUI, having an open container and driving on a revoked license (R. 116:28).
At the jail, Deputy Talbot asked defendant if he would submit to an Intoxilyzer test
(R. 116:55). Defendant initially refused, but ultimately agreed (id.). The results of the
tests determined defendant's blood alcohol was .093 - in excess of .08, the level at which
it is illegal to operate a vehicle (R. 116:60).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
First and foremost, this Court should not review defendant's arguments because
they are inadequately briefed. This Court should reject defendant's arguments because
they are presented cursorily with little citation to caselaw or to the record.
If this Court reaches the merits, it should still affirm defendant's conviction
because he has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance was deficient or
that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficiencies. Defendant's claim that his trial
counsel should have pursued a motion to suppress fails because (1) Deputy Talbot clearly
had probable cause to effect the traffic stop when he saw defendant driving on a
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completely flat tire and (2) the deputy had reasonable suspicion to detain and probable
cause to arrest defendant based on the smell of alcohol, an open container of beer in the
vehicle, defendant's revoked driver's license and defendant's admission he had been
drinking. Thus, a motion to suppress evidence would have been pointless.
Defendant's complaints concerning the testimony of Utah Highway Patrol Trooper
Scott Hathcock are similarly defective. Defendant's claim that trial counsel should have
objected to the State's allegedly defective notice of expert testimony fails because the
record demonstrates that the notice was not defective. Moreover, contrary to defendant's
argument, Trooper Hathcock's testimony was well within the scope of his expertise.
ARGUMENT
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must identify acts or
omissions showing that his trial counsel's performance did not meet "an objective
standard of reasonableness." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 690
(1984). A defendant must also show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsels]' unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
Id. at 694; see also State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1258 (Utah 1993) ("A reasonable
probability is that which is sufficient to undermine the confidence in the reliability of the
outcome."). Defendant does not meet either prong of the Strickland test. His conviction
should therefore be affirmed.

5

I.

DEFENDAiYTS ARGUMENTS SHOULD BE
REJECTED BECAUSE THEY ARE INADEQUATELY
BRIEFED.

Defendant's arguments should not be considered by this Court because they are
inadequately briefed. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (an argument "shall contain the
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including
the grounds for reviewing an issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on."); State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299,
305 (Utah 1998) (rule 24(a)(9) "requires not just bald citation to authority but
development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority"), State v.
Smith, 1999 UT App 370, f 9, 995 P.2d 14 (defendant's brief is so inadequate that it
"impermissibly shifted the burden of analysis to the reviewing court").
Defendant's argument section is scarcely four pages long with little more than
boiler-plate citations to the standard Strickland line of cases. Aplt. Br. at 7-10. Even
marginally relevant caselaw is recited cursorily with virtually no attempt to apply the law
to the facts. Moreover, defendant selectively recites facts to remove portions of Deputy
Talbot's testimony that he stopped defendant for violating safety regulations by driving
on a flat tire (R. 116:24).
Additionally, the analysis defendant provides consists almost entirely of naked
assertions unsupported by caselaw. For example, defendant states:
In this matter, the record shows clearly that Mr. Galvez's trial
strategy was jury nullification asking the jury to disregard the
6

breath test results merely because the officer's certification
was lapsed at the time he operated the Intoxilyzer....
Counsel attempted to compare the lapsed certification to
practicing law without a license....
Aplt. Br. at 8. Defendant provides no citation to cases discussing jury nullification.1 Nor
does he provide citation or analysis to suggest it is inappropriate or erroneous for trial
counsel to attack the Intoxylizer results by attacking the officer's certification.
II.

THE PERFORMANCE OF DEFENDANT'S TRIAL
COUNSEL WAS NOT OBJECTIVELY DEFICIENT.
A.

A Motion to Suppress Would Have Been
Denied; Thus, Defendant's Trial Counsel
Cannot be Deficient for Failing to Pursue
Such a Motion.

Defendant faults his trial counsel for failing to pursue a motion to suppress
because Deputy Talbot did not have reasonable suspicion to pull him over. Br. Aplt. at 89. However, given that the traffic stop and subsequent arrest of defendant are
unassailable under Utah law, trial counsel cannot be faulted for not filing a futile motion.
It cannot be disputed that Deputy Talbot had reasonable suspicion to stop
defendant when he saw him driving with a completely flat tire. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann

1

In fact, there is little to suggest the strategy of defendant's trial counsel was jury
nullification. Trial counsel uses the term only once in his opening statement and appears
to misapprehend it as meaning simply that jurors are the ultimate arbiters of guilt or
innocence. For example, trial counsel states: 'Tm not asking you to ignore the evidence
or to say, Oh well, you know, he must not be guilty because of some convoluted thinking
process.... I'm asking you is the whole testimony by the deputy truthful, consistent,
necessarily so? Obviously he wasn't certified. You get to decide what that means, what it
may or may not mean." See R. 116:110.
7

§ 41-6-150(e)( 1998) (*4A person shall not operate any vehicle when one or more of the
tires in use on that vehicle is in unsafe operating condition . . . " ) ; see also State v. Lopez,
873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) ("[A]s long as an officer suspects that the 'driver is
violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations,' the
police officer may legally stop the vehicle") (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
661 (1979)). While discussing the flat tire with defendant, Deputy Talbot smelled a
"very distinct odor of alcohol" on defendant's breath (R. 116:24). Further, defendant had
an open container in his vehicle and admitted he had consumed alcohol (id.). These facts
gave rise to reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence of
alcohol. See, e.g., Layton City v. Bennett, 741 P.2d 965, 967 (Utah App. 1987) (police
officer's observations of defendant and odor of alcohol provided reasonable suspicion for
detention and investigation of DUI). Under these circumstances, the further detention
and ultimate arrest of defendant was axiomatic.
Nonetheless, defendant suggests that a motion to suppress could have been filed
based on Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1992), which held that a police
officer was justified in performing a "caretaker stop" of a motorist after being informed
that the driver was contemplating suicide. Warden is inapposite. Deputy Talbot was not
performing a caretaker stop; rather, he had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's car
because he was driving on a flat tire.
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In short, because the deputy had reasonable suspicion for the initial stop and the
continued detention of defendant, a motion to suppress would have been futile. "Failure
to raise futile objections does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel." State v.
Kelley, 2000 UT 41,f 26, 1 P.3d 546. Thus, the decision of defendant's trial counsel
forego the suppression hearing was not only reasonable, but obligatory. His performance
was clearly not deficient.
Additionally, defendant has not met the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis.
Strickland, 466 at 694. Defendant fails to provide any indication as to how his trial
counsel's alleged deficiencies were harmful or how the result of his trial would have been
different but for the alleged errors. Although the granting of a motion to suppress would
likely have changed the outcome of the case, defendant provides no analysis to
demonstrate the likelihood that such a motion would have succeeded. Thus, even if trial
counsel had pursued the motion to suppress, the result of the trial would not have been
different.
B.

The State's Notice to Defendant of Trooper
Hathcock's Expert Testimony Met the
Requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(1).

Defendant's next complaint is that his trial attorney should have protested when
"the State provided defective notice of it's [sic] expert witness, Scott Hathcock . . . "
because the notice did not contain affidavits concerning the Intoxilyzer device and the
trooper's vita. Br. Aplt. at 9-10. This claim is baseless.
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Utah law requires notice of intent to call an expert witness at least 30 days before
trial.
If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify
in a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing held
pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party
intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as
practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before the
hearing. .. . Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the
expert's curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(a) & (b).
On February 20, 2001 - more than 30 days before the April 18, 2001, trial date the State provided notice to defendant that it intended to call Trooper Hathcock "to testify
at trial concerning the certification and proper working order of the Intoxilyzer that was
used in this case" (R. 44). See copy of State's Notice of Intent to Call Expert Witness,
dated February 20, 2001, attached as Addendum B. The Notice continues: "Attached also
find copies of the intoxilyzer affidavits for before and after the date of the test and a copy
of Trooper Hathcock's Curriculum Vitae."
As noted, defendant claims neither the affidavits nor Trooper Hathcock's vitae
were attached to the notice. However, defendant provides nothing to substantiate this
claim and the record clearly indicates otherwise. Although the Notice filed with the trial
court does not contain the affidavits and vitae, that does not mean that the documents
were not provided to counsel. The rule requires "notice to the opposing party," not to the
court. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(1). Absent some indication to the contrary, this
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Court should assume that the facts comport with the record. State v. Litherland, 2000 LT
761f 17, 12 P.3d 92 ("Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or
deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that
counsel performed effectively"); see also Helmuth v. Morris, 598 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah
1979) ("Inasmuch as the record fails to indicate anything to the contrary, it is to be
presumed that the proceedings were carried out in accordance with the requirements of
law . . . " ) . Moreover, the portions of the trial transcript covering Trooper Hathcock's
testimony and the introduction of the Intoxilyzer affidavits provide no indication that
defendant's trial counsel was surprised or unfamiliar with the trooper's credentials or the
contents of the affidavits (R. 116: 75-78). Thus, defendant's claim that his counsel was
ineffective for not objecting to inadequate notice of the State's expert is without record
support and should be rejected.
Nor has defendant shown any prejudice. If, as defendant claims, the notice of
expert testimony was improper, the only remedy would have been a continuance. Utah
Code Ann. § 77-17-13(4). Absent a showing that a later trial would have yielded a
different result, defendant's claim of prejudice fails.2
2

Defendant also purports to argue that Trooper Hathcock "inappropriately
exceeded the scope of the suggested testimony." Aplt. Br. at 10. This argument is
presented in four sentences and is clearly inadequately briefed. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9).
Moreover, a review of Trooper Hathcock's testimony shows it was well within his
expertise and provided the foundation for admission of the breath tests. Finally,
defendant provides no indication as to how omitting the allegedly improper testimony of
Trooper Hathcock would have affected the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, he has not
shown error or prejudice and his ineffective assistance claim fails.
11

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that defendant's
conviction be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day 1st day of July, 2002.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
BRETT J. DELPORTO
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, this 1st day of July, 2002 to:
D. Bruce Oliver
D. BRUCE OLIVER
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah
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Addenda

Addendum A

Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 Expert testimony generally -Notice requirements.
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify in a
felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing held pursuant to Rule
7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party intending to call the expert shall give
notice to the opposing party as soon as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or
ten days before the hearing.
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's curriculum
vitae, and a copy of the expert's report.
(2) (a) The expert shall prepare a written report relating to the proposed
testimony.
(b) If the expert has not prepared a report or the report does not adequately inform
concerning the substance of the expert's proposed testimony including any opinion and
the bases and reasons of that opinion, the party intending to call the expert shall provide
to the opposing party a written explanation of the expert's anticipated testimony sufficient
to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony, followed by a
copy of any report prepared by the expert when available.
(3) (a) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report, the party receiving
notice shall provide to the other party notice of witnesses whom the party anticipates
calling to rebut the expert's testimony, including the name and address of any expert
witness and the expert's curriculum vitae. If available, a report of any rebuttal expert shall
be provided to the other party.
(b) If the rebuttal expert has not prepared a report or the report does not adequately
inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed testimony, or in the event the
rebuttal witness is not an expert, the party intending to call the rebuttal witness shall
provide a written explanation of the witness's anticipated rebuttal testimony sufficient to
give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony, followed by a
copy of any report prepared by any rebuttal expert when available.
(4) (a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet the requirements of this
section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a continuance of the trial or hearing
sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony.

(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the result of bad
faith on the part of any party or attorney, the court shall impose appropriate sanctions.
(5) (a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a preliminary hearing
held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure constitutes notice of the
expert, the expert's qualifications, and a report of the expert's proposed trial testimony as
to the subject matter testified to by the expert at the preliminary hearing.
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the preliminary hearing shall
provide the opposing party with a copy of the expert's curriculum vitae as soon as
practicable prior to trial or any hearing at which the expert may be called as art expert
witness.

Addendum B

L. DEAN SAUNDERS, UBN 6324
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEYS OFFICE
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., 2D FLOOR
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
TELEPHONE: (801) 399-8377

FEB 2 •: -y?

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,

STATE'S NOTICE OF INTENT
TO CALL EXPERT WITNESS.

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 001901546
CLAY Y. STARK,
Judge: STANTON M. TAYLOR
Defendant.

L. Dean Saunders, Deputy Weber County Attorney by and for the State of Utah, hereby
gives notice pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (l)(a) of the States intention to call Scott
Hathcock, of the Utah Highway Patrol to testify at trial concerning the certification and proper
working order of the intoxilyzer that was used in this case. Attached also find copies of the
intoxilyzer affidavits for before and after the date of the test and a copy of Trooper Hathcock's
Curriculum Vitae.

Respectfully submitted this

7-0 4rday of February, 2001.
DEAN SAUNDERS
Deputy Weber County Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing notice was hand delivered
or mailed, postage pre-paid, to:
Jorge H. Galvez
Attorney for Defendant
155 South 300 West, Suite 205
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
DATED this,3P/ft day of January, 2001.
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